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The Financial Reconstruction of China
and·
The Consolidation of ·china's Present
Indebtedness.
I. - The Constitutional and Political Problem.
The financial reconstruction of China is not primarily a financial problem.
It is a constitutional and political question, the solution of which lies in the read
justment of the relations between the Pr vinces and the Central Government.
The Manchu regine had evolved an elaborate and well balanced system of
internal administration which left to the Provinces a large autonomy, whilst
affirming the super-ior authority of the Throne. All offit:!ials down to the Magis
trate were appointed from Peking, under two very stri_ct rules, viz.: 1 ° that no
person could hold office in his native province, and 2 ° that the term of office was
limited to three ye�rs, with only one possible extension. The Govern
ment was very careful to select as Viceroys or Governors personages devo
ted to the Imperial Family, and, in the distribution of offices, to keep the
balance even between Chinese and Manchu�, as well as between the various
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- 2 provincial parties or clans. The consequence was that the governing body of a
Province would always consider themselves as representing the Central
Government, and would not think of identifying with the populati0n under their
control, or supporting provincial interest against Imperial prerogative. Their
task was facilitated by the granting of wide powers which enabled them to
settle direct most of the local questions. Once the Imperial authorities in
Peking were satisfied with the loyalism of the holders of the main official posi
tions, they would leave them a free hand in the administration of the province,
provided only that the taxes and provincial contributions be duly remitted every
year to the Central Treasury.
When additional revenue was required for meeting new obligntions, in
ternational or domestic, an equitable understanding would always be reached,
tae provinces showing the same consicterntion for the need:; of the Central
Government as Peking would show for the local intc:rests.
The foundations of the system were shattered by the 1912 revolution. The
whole structure was built on the d�vot.ion of the Viceroys and Governors to the
Emperor. The Emperor abdicated. MoRt of the high officials resigned or dis
appeared. A Provisional Republican constitution w..is promulgated which treated
China as a highly centralized State, thus ignoring the main constitutional problem
of the country. The Central Govornment was left unarmerl, with practically no
power of control over the provincial authorities, whilst the provinces were being
given local Assemblies though which they could develop separatist tendencies.
The old machinery kept in motion for some time, but soon the provincial chiefs,
whether Civil Governors, or Military Governors, or General Inspectors, found that
it was more profitable to side with the Provinces than with the Central Govern
ment, seeing that in fact the money was coming from the Provinces and that
it was easier for the provinces to live apart of the Central Government than
for the Central Government to dispense with the support of the Provinces.
Thus developed the present condition of affairs. It cannot improve
materially unless the nature of the relations between the Central Government
and the Provinces be clearly defined (which is the constitutional side of the
problem), and unless the new distribution of power between the Provinces and
the Central Government is accepted by the provincial nuthorities or forced upon
them (which is the political side of the problem). No reduction of the army,
no- disbandment of the superfluous soldiery is worth being undertaken so long as
the Tuchuns, Civil Governors, or other such provincial chiefs can defy the
orders of the Government, seize the revenue, and recruit fresh troops at their
own wi11. Neither can the finances of the G�vrrnment be put on a sound basis
if the proceeds of Government taxation continue being appropriated by the local
military or civil authorities.
1
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II. _:_ The Comparative Situation of China.

Happily for China, the resources of the country are so great and the
charges so light that even a moderate improvement in the political situation
would remove many of the financial difficulties.
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With more than 400 millions inhabitants, it is d�:mbtful whether the gov
ernmental, provincial and local taxation in China proper exceeds 500 million
dollars a year, an average of $1,20 per head. It is almost nothing when compared
with taxation in the other parts of the world. Precise figures cannot be worked
out becau e of the fluctuations in the rates of exchange and because the budgets
of most of the forejgn Power� are still subject to important variations from year
to year. But a rough calculation, which is quite sufficient for our purpose, shows
that the annual per capita revenue derived from taxes and duties in the
fo1Jowing countrie�, r duced into silver, amounts to:
Great Britain ....... ...... ............ .... .................• • $ 170
· France ..............................................• ....... $ 90
Italy ......................................................... $ 24
Belgium....... . ........... ........ ............ ............... $ 30
United States (Federal taxation only) ........................ $ 120

Of course, full y developed States of Europe anrl America can pay higher
taxation than China. But turning to th?. countries of Asia which are lying on
the coHst of the Pacific and whose conditions may- compare with those obtaining
in China, the figures are, per capita:
Janan .....................................·................. $
Philippines .................................................. $
French Indochina ............................................ $
Siam ........................................................ $
Dutch East Indies .......................................... $

16,00
7,50
5,50
9,50
15,00

The Chinese average of $ 1,20 is about one fifth of the average
taxation paid in French Indochin:-i, and one e�ght of the average
taxation paid in Sfam. Yet, the population of China is more indus
trious, more hard working, and has more resources, agricultural, com
mercial, industrial and mineral than the population of French Indochina or
Siam. The Chinese nation feels the burden of taxation not so much because it
is excessive' than because the system is cumbersome, because it works injustice
on many classes of citizens, because it is made the pretext for all sorts of malprac-

-
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tices, and Rbov0 all because the taxpayer is given very littl.e in return for what
he pays. If slightly reformed and propej:-}y controlled, and if its proceeds were
used for the real benefit of the people, a nett revenue of nearly 450 millions
dollars could easily be collected.
National debts are at present a crushing burden on most of the European
and American Powers. Their per capita ratio reaches appalling figures in
several countries:
Great Britain . .... , ......... .... _ ....... ........ ....· .... ... $ 1,440
France ..... .. .. .... ...... :. .. .............. ........ ..... ..... $ 1,310
United States (Federal debt only) ....... ..................... $ 433
Belgium ....... � ..... : ........ , ............................. $ 312
Ita I.v • • . • . • • , . • . . • . . . . . . • . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . ,. . • . . . • . • • • $ 190
50
Japan ......... , ... ...... . . .. .......... ........ .. ...... .... . $
Now, the present public r:lebt of China, domestic and foreign (exclusive of
railway debts which are not included in the above foreign �tatistics) is under
1,900 millions silver dollars, or Four Dolfo1·s Seventy Fi vc ce11ts per head,
two hundred and fifty times less than the per capita ratio of the Briti3h and
French public debt.
The service of the secured Chinese debts, domestic and foreivn, requires at
the most 95 millions dollars a vear. The consolidation of the unsecured debts, as
shown below, may rPquire dU:ring the next year� from 40 to 45 million� a year.
That is to say a maximum grand total of 140 millions dollars per year leaving
300 millions. or 25 millions per month, for the governmental, provincial and
local expenditure. This is quite enough for making a start in efficient admin
istration and balancing a reasonable budget. More money will of course be soon
required for police, education, hygiens, agriculture, trade and otherwise
fostering the economic development of the country. A few reforms in taxation (
would at once bring in the necessary revenue seing that for every te11 ceuts
increace in the pe,� capita ratio the Treasury would receive an additional 40
'J,.
millions dollars a year.

III. -The unsecured indebtedness.
The first step towards financial reconstruction is the settlement of the
present unsecured indebtedne�s of the Chinese Government. For some of these
debts the creditors have succt!eded in getting irregula1· payments. For most of
them neither interest nor capital had been paid for one year or more. The
situation affects the local financial market, since all the Chinese Banks are on
the list of the creditors and are badly in need of the mon�y owing to them. It
affects still more the credit of China at home and abroad. It blocks every possible
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attempt of the Chinese Goverbment to raise loans for constructive pur1l0ses at
rei.sonable rates. It puts the Ministry of Finance in the most difficult position.
Some sort of remedy must be found if national bankruptcy is to be avoided.
In the statistics compiled in October 1922 by the Ministry of Finance, the
unsecured indebtedness is reported as follows, interest being calculated up to
the end of the year 1922 :
Unsecured domestic loans • • • • • • . . . . • • • • . $ 132, 660 ,000
Unsecured foreign loans • . . • . . . . . . . . . .
239, 930 , 000
Chinese Banks short term debts as approved by the Redemption
84,500,000
. • ! •
Commis�ion. . · • . . . . • . .
Treasury Notes. . . . . . .
33,700,000
• • • •
48,250,000
Chinese Banks short term debts .
• $ 488,940,0 00
'fotal . . • . . . .
To this total must be added:
The amount due under the renewed Austrian Loan agreement.
The agreement seems to have been cancelled, but the money is
nevertheless still owing to the present bondholders . . . . £ 5,200,000
Interest on the whole of the unsecured debt up to July 1923, no
settlement of the consolidation question being possible before
that date. . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . ·$ 25,000,000
The calculations for nxchange in the statistic� of the Ministry of Finance
are not quite safe. The sterling is reckoned at 8 dollars to the pound, whilst
the present rate is 9. The rate adopted for the yen is also too low. A conserva
tive estimate would work as follows:
P,·iucipal
Debts in silve,· doi/a,·s or T�el.3 redui:!ed into silver dolJar.9 . . . 8 284,588,000
Debts i11 steding • . • • • • • • • . . . £ • 3,136, 000
Plus Austrian Loans . .
. •. • • . £
5,200, 000
Total . • • . • . • • • . . . • £
8,336, 000
.
•
•
at $9 to the pound • . .
Fcs 167,500,000
Debts i1z f1·a11cs. • . •
at fcs 7 to the dollar . . • • . • . • .
. Y 162,655,000
Debts iu yens. . . . .
at S0.90 to the yen.
. GD 12,342,000
Debts iu gold do/!an •
at $1.90 to the GD.
Total •

.•

75,024,000
23,927,000
146,389,000
23,468,000

$ 508,396,000

-- 6 Interest
Interest up to December 81st 1922. . • •
Interest from January to June 1923.
Grand Total. . . • . • • • .

$ 41.000,000
25,000,000
$ 569,396,000

The unsecured indebtednes3 of the Chinese G::>Vernment, as it will stand by the
middle of the year 1923 may be accordingly put, in round figuras, at 570 millions
dollars. A large part of the capital of such indebtedness has already matured
or wrn soon matura. Interest is aho in arrear3. There ii no hope of finding
sufficent money to satisfy the creditora according to the original contracts. It
might even prove impossible to pay thern were time only granted, because part of
the money has been· borrowed at such high rates that the accumulated interest
would exceed· the future available resources of the Government. Consolidation is
imperative as the only way out the difficulty.
Consolidation, as a general proposition, means the redemption of the exis
ting debts through the issue of new bonds, the substitution of new bonds for the
-old ones involving:
1) an extension of time for the short terms debts,
2) a reduction of the interest in every case where excessive rates have been
charged,
3) as a compensation for such extension of time and reduction of interest,
the granting of adequate securities.
Consolidation will be a surcess if sound and reliable security is offered. Cre
ditors whose debts are overdue, or whose debts are shortly to mature, and cre
dito�s entitled to high rates of interest under their contracts will certainly agree
to accept, in exchange for what is due to them, long term bonds bearing a rea
sonable rate of interest if payment of interest and repayment of capital are
fully guaranteed, that is to say if the pledged revenue is sufficient and sufficient
ly controlled to secure complete payment of coupons and amortizati'ln of the new
bonds on due dates.
IY.-The Customs Revenue.
The better the security China can offer her unsecured creditors, the better
the terms of the consolidation will be for the Chinese Government.
The best security in China is the revenue of the maritime and native cus
toms under the control of the Inspector General.
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Is it possible to secure the consolidation of an indebtedness of about 5
millions dollars on the revenue uf the Customs ?
In order to answer the question, let us figure what the.future nett reven
of the Custome is likely to be. By nett ,·evenue is meant the revenue availab
for loans and indemnities after the ordinary and extraordinary administrati
expenses of the Customs service have been met.
The nett revenue ·of the Customs for the year 1922 amoanted in rou
figures:
For the Maritime Customs, to • •
For the Native Customs. to •

.

Total .
.
or in dollars at the rate of 73 •
say Seventy seven millious dollars.

. .

• • • Sh. Taels
• Sh. Taels
• Sh. Taels

52,150,00
4,200,00
56,350,0
77,191,5

The increase to the full 5% which has come into force on the 17th of Jan
ary 1923 will work only during part of the present year, all goods having le
foreign ports prior to such date being charged the old t�riff. It may be expect
however to give 8 millions dollars in 1923 and 10 millions dollars in 1924.

erest,

The raising of the import tariff from 5 % to 7 ½ % for ordinary goo
and to 10 % for luxuries may yield 28 millions. As it is unlikely that it m
work in 1923, let us reckon it from 1924 only.

, Cre
d ere
agree
area
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cient
e new

Besides, there is a gradual increase of revenue resulting from the natur
development of trade. From 1911 to 1922 the average increase has been t
millions taeb a year. From 1917 to 1922 it is more .than three millions taels
year. From 1919, after the last tariff revision, to 1922, it is over four millio
taels a year. It is steadily increasing, and with a tariff to be raised from 5
to 7 ½ and 10 % we may safely anticipate it to be three millions dollars (Ta
2,200,000) a year for the next five yearg (from 1923 to 1927). After 1927
may figure it for another ten years at two millions dollars a year.
Working on those data, the probable nett future revenue of the Custo
may be calculated as follows:
For the year 192� :

better

� cus-

• • • • • • • • •
Nett revenue of 1922 •
Increase from the fulJ 5 % during part only of the year ., •
Increase from development of trade. • • • • • • • • •
Total • •

• • • • • • • • • •

77,000,0
8,000,0
3,000,0

. . S 88,000,0

- 8 For the year 1924.
• $ 88,000,000
Nett r�ven ue of 1923
. . .
'
Increase from the full 5% during the whole of the year . . .
2,000,000
Increase from new 7½ and 10% tariff . . . . . .. . . .
28,000,000
Increase from development of trade
3,000,000
.• $ 121,000,000

Total. . .
For the year 1925:
Nett revenue of 1924
Increase from development of trade . •

• $ 121,000,000
3,000,000
• $ 124,000,000

-T:;tal
For the year 1926:
Nett revenue of 1925
Increase from development of trade .

• $ 124,000,000
3,000,000
. $ 127,000,000

Total. . .
For the year 1927:
Nett revenue of 1926
Increase from .development of trade .

. $ 137,000,000
3,000,000
. $ 130,000,000

1,otal
For the year 1928:
Nett revenue of 1927.
Increase from development of trade .
Total. . . . .

• . $ 130,000,000
2,000,000
• • $ 132,000,000

. . • . . .

• $ 150,000,000

and so on till the nett revenue reaches.

But the nett revenue of the Customs is already earmarked for the service of
the foreign loans of 1895, 1896 and 1898, of the Boxer lnd"mnities, of the Reor
ganization Loan of 1913 anct of various domestic loans.
rrhe following table
obligations.

shows

what is

required

for meeting

-
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The figures of the foreign loans
have been compiled from the off
icial tables
of interest and amortization atta
ched to the original loan contracts.
The Boxer Indemnity is calcula
ted at 50 % of its outstanding
amount, that
is to say less the German,
Austrian and Russian shares, wit
h the further
assumption that the deferred ann
uities of the years 1917-1922 are pos
tponed to
1941-1�45.
Sterling is calculated at 10 dol
lars to the pound.
The domestic Joans are tabulat
ed in accordance with the official figu
res
published by the Ministry of
Finance.
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Table I

Table 1

Years

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
to
1960

I

Russo-·French
loan

1 895

8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700
8.366.700

1·
'

Anglo-German
loan

1 896

9.521.000
9.513.000
9.505.000
9.497.000
9.489.000
9.480.000
9.470.000
9.460.000
9.450.000
9.440.000

I

Anglo-German
loan

' 1 898

$
8.277.000
8.274.000
8.270.000
8.267.000
8.263.00f)
8.259.000
8.255.000
8.250.000
8.246.000
8.241.000
8.236.000
8:231.000
8.225.000
8.220·.ooo
8.214.000
8.208.00C,
8.201.000
8.194.000
8.18'7.000
8.180.000
8.172.000

I

Boxer
Indemnity
1 901

18.370.000
18.370.000
18.370.000
18.370,000
18.370.000
18.370.000
18.370.000
18 370.000
13.370.000
26.500.000
26.500.000
26.500.000
26.500.000
26.500.000
26.500.000
26.500.000
26.000.000
:W.500.000
18.300.000
18.300.000
18.300.000
19.300.000
18 300.000

Reorgaiird Year
lion LcLoan

191�1914

$
13.50(500.000
15.00(000.000
1s.oo<ooo.ooo
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
lJ.000
15.000
15.000,
l 5.0�0.
15.000
15.000
15.00
15.000,
15.000,
15.00

15.00
15.00,
15. 0 0C.
15.00C,

I

GES

I

500.000
5 0 0.000
500.000
000.000
500.000
300.000
300.000
.300.000
.300.000
300.000

Fourth Vear

Fifth Year

1915

1916

$

$

Loan

5.700.000

15.00 0
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
lJ.000
15.000
· 15.000
15.0�0
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15.000
15. 0 00
15.000
15.000
15. 0 00
15.000
15.000

I

REVENUE

.. .. ..

.

.

..

Loan

$

.. ..

... .. ..

.

.

.. .. ..

.

1918

.. .. ..

.�

.

Loan

2.700.000
2.700.000
2.700.000
2.700.000
2.700.000
7.132.500
6.862.500
6.n92.500
6.322.500
6.052.500
5.782,500
5.512.500
5.242.500
4.972.500
4.702.500

1.125.455
1.125.455
1.125.455
4.251.720
7.096.621
6.720.469
3.320.052

.. .. ..

.. ..

Seventh Year

I

Consolidated
Loan

·

1921

$
20 .435�284
19.627.657
19.861.806
21.644.251
12.728.154
12.095.824
11.463.494
10.831.164

I

Eleventh Vear j
Loan

1922

$
2.760.000
2.600.000
2.400.000
2.280. 000
2.120.000

- 12 Table II gives the total of the charges on the
the charges for foreign obligations
rate of ten dollars to the pound.
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TOTAL CHARGES ON CUSTOMS REVENUE
Years

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
Hl43
1944
1945
1946
1947

to

1960
1961
1962

e II

Foreign

Internal
Loans

$
58.034.700
59.523.700
59.511.700
59.500.700
59.488.700
59.473 700
59.461.700
59.446.700
59.366.000
59.201,000
49.756.000
4ri_751.ooo
49.745.000
49.640.000
49.634.000
49.628.000
49.621.000
49.614.000
41.487.000
41.480.000
41.472.000
33.300.000
33.300.000
15.000.000

$
36.220.739
32.053.112
29.127.260
30.875.971
24.644.775
25.948.793
21.646.046
17.423.664
6.322.500
6.052.000
5.782.500
5.512.500
5.242.500
4.972.500
4.70�.500

Obligalior.s

15.000.000

nil

nil

.. .. ..

.. .. ..

.. .. ..

Total

$
94.255.43
91.576.81
88.638.96
90.376.67
84.133.47
85.422.49
81.107.74
76.870.36
65.688.50
65.253.50
55.538.5
55.263,5
54.987.50
54.612.50
54.336.50
49.628.00
49,621.0
49.614.0
41.487.0
41,480.0
41,472.0
33.300.0
33.300.0
15.000.0
15.000.0

nil

nil

-· 14 Comparing now the figures in Table II with the figures of the probable
future revenue of the Customs, as we have worked them out, Table III shows
which nett balance may be available for consolidation purposes.

Table Ill

Table Ill

BALANCE AVAILABLE FOR CONSOLIDATION
(In round.figures)

:·•�
Years
"

.r:::i.

II
;� II

!

1923
1924
1925
1!126

]927

1928

1929

f;-

�

_...,
'·'i

I,

I,

:

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947

to

1960
1961

Nett Revenue

.I

Charges
-

$
:1:: Ir
88.000.000
121.000.000
124.000.000 ,, 127.000,000
130.000.000
132.000.000
134.000.000 1,
136 000.000
13 .000.000
140.000.000
142.000.000
144.000.000 ,,
146.000.000
148.000.000
150.000.000
150.000.000
150.000.000
150.000.000
150.000.000
150.000.000
150.000.000 1,
150.000.\. 00
150.000.000
150.000.000

$
94.250.000
91.500.000
88.700.000
90.500.000
84.lJ0.000
85.500.000
81.100.000
77.000.000
66.000.000
65.000.000
55.500.000
55.500.000
55.000.000
55.000.000
54.500.000
50.000.000
50.000.000
50.000.000
41.500.000
41.500.000
41.500.000
33.500.000
33.500.000
15.000.000

150.000.000

15.000.000

150.000.000

nil

I

Deficit

Surplus

$
6.250.000

..

..
..

I•

lo

I

.. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .. ..

.. .. ..

..
..
..
..
..
..

.. ..
.. ..

..
..
..
..

..
..
.. .
..

.. ..
.. .. ..
..

,·

$

.. ..

29.500.000
35.300.000
36.500.000
45.850.000
46.500.00()
52.900.000
59.000.000
72.000.000
75.000.000
86.500.000
88.500.000
91.000.000
93.000.000
95.500.000
100.000.000
100.000.000
100.000.000
108.500.000
108.500.000
108.500.000
116.500.000
116.500.000
135.000.000
135.000.000
150.000.000
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It appears from Table III that a 6,250,000 dollars deficit i� to be foreseen
for the year 1923, but that there will be a surplus balance of 80 millions dollars
in 1924, regularly increasing each year till it reaches 72 millions dollars in 1931.
The increase in the balance is due to a large extent to the total of the existing
charges dropping from 94,250,000 dollars in 1923 to 66 millions in 1213 and to
. 55 millions in 1933.
It seems therefore that a consolidation scheme may be based on the Customs
Revenue, provided:
a) that means be devised to find some additional funds during the first
years, and
b) that interest onlv_ on the consolidation bonds be paid up to 1931, red
emption beginning in 1932.
The available surpluses from 1932 onwards are sufficient to secure amortiz
ation in a short period of time.

V.-A Consolidation Scheme
A mere �lance at the tables of the Chinese Foreign and Domestic indebted
ness, as published in October 1922 by the Ministrv of Finance, shows that the
indebtedness consists of a variety of debts, few loans totalling more than ten
mil1ions dollars, and most of them being loans of less than one miJlion dollars.
The currencies are different, some of the debts being in silver dolhrs, some in
sterling, some in yens, some in francs, etc. The rates of interest and the dates
or periods of repayment also widely differ. It seems impossible to con�olidate
such a mass of heterogeneous obligations with bonds in one single currency,
bearing all the same rate of interest, and redeemable under the same conditions.
With regard to the currency, there can be no question of converting the
domestic debts in dollars into bond� in a foreign currency. On the other hand, if
creditors of debts in foreign currencies are offered bonds in silver dollars, they
will point out that the conversion of sterlin2 or gold dollars into Chinese currency
involves a risk, and that they will not accept the risk unless conversion is made at
a higher rate that the then prevailing exchange quotation. A creditor in sterling
for instance may request that his debt be converted into dollars at the rate of
eleven to the pound when t�e market rate is nine only, and so on. The best
system, to avoid discussions and losses for the Government, would be to issue as
many sets of new bonds as there are different kinds of currencies employed in
the loan agreements, say one set in chinese dollars, one set in sterling, one set in
francs, etc., and to offer dollar bonds to the dollar creditors, sterling bonds to the
sterling creditors, franc bonds to the franc credito1 s, etc.
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The next point is interest. Most of the unsecured debts bear interest at the
rate of 8% or over. In substitution for them, well secured bonds guaranteed on
the revenue of the Customs ought to be accepted at lower rates, coupled with a
reasonable redemption pre!llium, for instance 7% bonds issued at 87 ,50 and
redeemable at 100. But several of the unsecured debts have been contracted at
better terms for China, e. g. the Loans of the Chicago Bank and of the Pacific
Development Co at 6%, the French Industrial Loan of 1913 at 5%, the War
Participation Loan at 7%. For the 7% loans, 7% bonds ought to be offered at
par. As to the 6% and 5% loans, the original terms ought to be preserved
or new bonds issued at 6% and 5% •
So much the same for the periods of redemption. The 1913 French Indus
trial Loan is r�deemable in 34 years beginning from 1930. There is no reason
to alter the original schedule and to substitute for jt a shorter period of amortiza•
tion For other loans it may be advisable sometimes to offer bond� redeemable
in a longer period. This may facilitate negotiations since the Government has
no power to impose consolidation ·and must discuss terms with each creditor.
Taking into consideration the following facts:
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a)

that part of the unsecured indebtedness bears interest at less than 8%;

b) that when rates over 8% were agreed it was on account of the risk
involved in lending money to the Government without proper securities, and that
once adequate security is furnished the excPssive rates must be lowered;
c). that the capital of some of the debts may be reduced, since it is dispro•
portionate with the amounts actually received by the Treasury; and
d) that among the unsecured debts are $33,700,000 Treasury Notes which
the holders never expected to be redeemed in full and on which a substantial
rebate may be imposed,
it seems that the tot::il unsecured indebtedness of the Chinese Government,
as it wm staud by the end of 1923, may be met by the issue of consolidation
bonds to a nominal amount not exceeding 625 millions dollars, bearing interest
at 7% pe1� year from October 1st 1923, the first semi-annual coupon being paya•
ble on April 1st 1924.

,est
� as
I in
tin
the

The calculation is based on the assurr.ption tha� the Commi3sion to which the
Washington Agreements have entrusted the duty to establish the 2½ Customs
surtax will meet and reach a decision before the end of the year.
Now the service of rnterest and amorti :z.ation in twelve years of a nominal
capital of 625 millions dollars bearing interest at 7% requires 977,814,000 a
year.
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r. If it is to run from Octobre 1
· Interest alone requires $43,750,000 a yea
, 500.
he charge for the year 1923 will be$ 10, 937
cannot begin prior to 1932, the
From Table III it appears that amortization
to pay interest only.
urpluses from 1923 till 193 1 being sufficient
Table IV shows how the scheme can work:

TABLE

obre 1923

Tab,

1932,the

TABLE SHOWING SERVICE OF A CONSOLIDATION 7 °/ LOAN OF 625 MIL
DOLLARS NOMINAL REDEEMABLE IN TWELVE YEARS FROM THE
SURPLUSES OF lHE CUSTOMS REVENUE.
0

Vear

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
(1)

I

Available
surplus of the
Customs

$

-6.250,000
29.500.000
35.300.000
36.500.000
45.850.000
46.500.000
52.900.000
69.000.000
72.000,000
75.000.000
86.500.000
88.500.000
91.000.000
93.000.000
95.000.000
100.000.000
100.000.000
100.000.000
I 08.500. 00 0
108.500.000
108.500.000
116.500.000
etc.
Deficit

(1)

Service
of consolidation
Loan

Deficit
to be met from
other sources

$

$

10.937 500
43.750.000
43,750.000
43.7{>0.000
43.750.000
43.750. 0 00
43.750.000
43.750.000
43.750.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77,814.000
77.814.000
77.814.000
77,814.000
nil
nil

17.187.000
14.250.000
8.450.000
7.250.000

2,814.000

.. .. ..
.'

.. .. ..
.. .. ..

Nett surp
of Custo1

2.100.0
2.750.0
9.650.0
15.250.0
28.250.0
'
8.686.
10.686.
13.186.
15.186.�
17.686.
22.186.1
22.186.
22.186.
30.686.
30.686.
30.686.
116.500.
etc.

.. ..

- 20 Some persons may think that the above figure3 are too optimistic. We
believe them to be rather conservative. It must be noted for instance
that the charges in sterling have been reckoned at ten dollars to the
pound. If the present rate under nine dollars maintains as an average during
the current year, the sterling charges in 1923 will amount to $52,000,000
instead of the tabulated $ 58,000,000, a decrease of $ 6,000,000 which will almost
entirely wipe l)Ut the initial deficit of $ 6,250,000. There is also a probability
that the full 5 % and the 2 ½ surtax will bring in more revenue than anticipated.
Anyway, taking the figures in table IV as they stand, the question is to
find security for the adverse balances of the years 1923-1926 , th.at is to say in
round figures for:
17,000,000
$ 14,000,000
$ 8,500,000
$ 7,250,000

in
in
in
in

1923
1924
1925
1926.

If the consolidation scheme is executed, all the present indebtedness wi11 be
included in it, and consequently all the pled!led revenues other than the Cus�oms
will be freed from charges. More particularly, there will be no more claims
over the surpluses of the Gabelle. It seems then that the .<:;aid surpluses could be
given as additional guarantee for such a period of time as deemed necessary.
A maximum of one million 500 thousand dollars per month from October
1923 to June 1925 and one million from July 1925 till the end of 1926 would
be sufficient. If the Government would like better to keep the Salt surpluses free
of charges so as to be able to dispose of them, no doubt that an arrangement
with the Chinese and Foreign Banks may be devised to that effect. Once a
Sound scheme for a 625 millions consolidation has been agreed upon, there
ought to be no difficulty in finding some equitable adjustment for the deficit of
the 1923-1926 period, inasmuch as the said deficit will probably be much less in
fact than tabulated in table IV.
A method for meeting the possihle 1923 deficit would be to have interest on
the new bonds ,4unning only from January 1924, the nominal capital being pro
portionately increased. The Government might aho consider the advisability of
altering the amortization tables of the Natiolial Cow;olidated Debt Service created
in 1921. A two years postponement of the redemption of some of the loans
included in that service might easily procure a balance of two or three millions a
year in 1924 and 1925.
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11.-Main Characteristics of the Proposed
Consolidation Scheme.
1° No distinction is made in the scheme bctweeu the domestic and the
foreign indebtedness. The idea is to treat all creditors of the Chinese Govern
ment alike and give them the same reliable security, whether they are Chinese
citizens or firms, or nationals of Foreign Powers. It is a a question of fairness
and justice. It is also to the best interest of the country. The purpose of the
consolidation is to restore China's credit. Such credit would not be
restored if part of the indebtedness of the Chinese Government would remain
unsecured, or unpaid, or irregularly paid. It has become essential for the Chin
ese Government that the investing public should make no distinction between
China's internal and external credit, the external credit being considered as
sound and the internal credit as bad or doubtful. When part of the credit of a
country is doubtful, the whole of such credit is affected thereby. The Chinege
Government must look forward for the time when they will be able to borrow
money without having to give specific sources of revenue as guarantee: the first
step towards such progress is regular and punctual performance of all Gove,·n•
ment obligatio11.�.
2° The effect of the consolidation, when completed, will be to substitute
the Customs Revenue and the Salt Revenue for all the other pledged revenues.
There will be no more foreign or domestic charges on the Wine and Tobacco
tax, on the Stamp duty, on the Octroi, on the Title Deeds tax, etc. The Chinese
Government will recover full rights over these various sources of revenue.
Besides, the Salt· Revenue will be pledged only for a few years and for a
co mparatively small amount, All the present creditors being satisfied, the
Ministry of Finance shall not be any more pressed by their incessant demands
for funds, and may devote its time and energy to the study of the most important
financial problems.
3° A neces ary condition for the success of any consolidation scheme based
on the Customs Revenue is that all the nett ,·evenue after payment of the expendi
ture of the Customs administration be appropriated by preference for the service
of the consolidation bonds. No other expenditure to take precedence over the
payment of interest and amortization of the said bonds. Consequently, the
appropriations which have already been granted for the Wai Chiao Pou and for
other such Government Departments, or which may be granted in future shall
be paid only on the surplus remaining after payment of the interest and amortiza
tion of the con olidation bonds. If Government expenditure of whatever sort
were allowed to take precedence over the consolidation bonds, the security of
these bonds would be impaired, and the whole scheme would fail.

I
- 22 Since however the result of the consolidation would be to put most of the
Salt surpluses at the disposal of the Government, the said expenditure might be
made payable by preference f, om the said surpluses.
4° In connection with the above remark, it must be noted that "appro
riations" out of the increase resulting from the full 5% tariff or out of the
increase resulting from the 21/2 surtax are not foasible. No separate accounts
of the increase are to be kept by the Customs administration. The pro
ceeds of the old tariff and of the increased tariff are to be received in
one single account since they are to be paid by the importers in a lump sum. A
merchant who imports in 1924 articles valued $1000 will not be chara-ed by the
Customs $35 for the old tariff, plus $15 for the full 5%, plus $25 for the 21/2
surtax. He will be charged $75 odd and the entry in the books of the Customs
will be an entry for $75. No subdistinctions will be made in the accounts and
it will be impossible to charge in the accounts a particular expense to a
pa..-tkular portion of the revenue.
5° The question of a future increase of the tariff up to 12 ½ % as compensa
tion for the abolition of likinhas been entirely left out of the present Memorandum.
'fhe suppression of the likin cannot be carried out until the relations between the
Central Government and the Provinces have been clearly defined and an agree
ment has been reached as to which revenue shall belong to the Government and
which to the Provinces. Besides, it is admitted thR.t the increase up to 12 ½ %
wm only compensate for the losses resulting from the suppression of the likin,
The reform is not intended to procure additional revenue to the State and cannot
be used for purposes of consolidation.
60 The question of the unpaid railway loans has also been left out of the
Memorandum because these loans are secured on the railways themselves with
additional specific guarantees and because their service may be met from the
railways receipts.
January 23rd 1923.
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